What Happened
The attackers deployed a new Go-based backdoor that uses Microsoft Teams servers for command-and-control. The post Microsoft Teams Relay Servers Abused in DragonForce Ransomware Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek .
Why It Matters
According to reporting, DragonForce ransomware operators deployed a new Go-based backdoor (Backdoor.Turn) that abuses legitimate Microsoft Teams TURN relay servers to disguise command-and-control traffic, making it appear as normal collaboration traffic and evading traditional network defenses.[1][3][6] The campaign shows long-term, covert persistence within a major U.S. services firm, without any evidence that Microsoft’s core infrastructure was breached; instead, standard Teams relay functionality was repurposed for malicious use.[1][3][6] For CyberSE.AI, this highlights that AI-enabled SaaS collaboration platforms and their networking primitives (e.g., TURN/QUIC over UDP 443) can be leveraged as covert channels for agent C2, requiring agents and defenses to treat "trusted" SaaS traffic as potentially hostile and to instrument process-aware and protocol-aware monitoring around these dependencies. Organizations should harden AI and agent architectures that rely on SaaS platforms by baselining expected service use, applying continuous red teaming against SaaS-based C2 patterns, and including SaaS communication behaviors in AI security readiness and threat modeling.
CyberSE Analysis
This signal maps to SaaS AI risk. Organizations using AI agents, LLM APIs, SaaS integrations, or sensitive data workflows should review whether this class of issue could create unauthorized tool execution, data leakage, weak approval gates, or unmanaged supply-chain exposure.
Recommended Actions
- Restrict AI agent tool permissions and production write paths.
- Review sensitive data access across prompts, logs, embeddings, memory, and SaaS integrations.
- Add human approval workflows for high-impact or state-changing actions.
- Run prompt injection and indirect prompt injection tests against affected workflows.
- Document the owner, control gap, and remediation deadline for this risk class.
Source
https://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-teams-relay-servers-abused-in-dragonforce-ransomware-attack/