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DragonForce Hackers Abuse Microsoft Teams Relays to Hide Backdoor.Turn C2 Traffic

thehackernews.com 2026-06-18 SaaS AI risk High

What Happened

Threat actors associated with the DragonForce ransomware have been observed using a custom Go-based remote access trojan (RAT) called Backdoor.Turn to conceal command-and-control (C2) traffic inside Microsoft Teams relay infrastructure. According to findings from Broadcom-owned Symantec and Carbon Black, the backdoor was deployed against a major U.S. services firm. The name of the company was

Why It Matters

The report describes DragonForce ransomware operators using a custom Go-based RAT, Backdoor.Turn, to tunnel command-and-control traffic through legitimate Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure, making malicious traffic appear as normal Teams connections.[1][2][9] Security products and defenders therefore primarily see outbound connections to trusted Microsoft Teams servers, complicating detection and response.[2][3] For CyberSE.AI, the key implication is that AI-enabled or collaboration-integrated SaaS environments (including AI copilots or bots embedded in Teams) are exposed to abuse of underlying SaaS transport and identity mechanisms for stealthy C2 and persistence; organizations need to harden network egress controls, SaaS logging, and identity protections around collaboration platforms before layering AI agents on top of them.

Healthcare Fintech SaaS SMB AI startups

CyberSE Analysis

This signal maps to SaaS AI risk. Organizations using AI agents, LLM APIs, SaaS integrations, or sensitive data workflows should review whether this class of issue could create unauthorized tool execution, data leakage, weak approval gates, or unmanaged supply-chain exposure.

Recommended Actions

  • Restrict AI agent tool permissions and production write paths.
  • Review sensitive data access across prompts, logs, embeddings, memory, and SaaS integrations.
  • Add human approval workflows for high-impact or state-changing actions.
  • Run prompt injection and indirect prompt injection tests against affected workflows.
  • Document the owner, control gap, and remediation deadline for this risk class.

Source

https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/dragonforce-hackers-abuse-microsoft.html

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